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HEART TRANSPLANTS:
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
REV. RAYMOND F. COLLINS *
T HAS NOW BEEN seventy-five years since Housman penned the
words:
His folly has not fellow
Beneath the blue of day
That gives to man or woman
His heart and soul away.
(A Shropshire Lad, XIV)
What seemed like a fool's dream just three quarters of a century
ago is no longer a dream, and today hardly seems foolish. Revolu-
tionary advances in medical and surgical science have given to man
new possibilities.
Yet every new possibility, whether of man's own making or of
man's discovery, creates for man a new responsibility. The extent of
his potentiality is the extent of his responsibility. Man must respond
to that which is and that which can be. That which man controls,
he must necessarily direct towards some end. Yet not every goal
towards which man can direct his activity is necessarily a moral one.
It is not trite to say that not everything which man can do, he ought
to do.
Thus man must necessarily raise the moral question. He must
ask whether he ought to do what he can do. Not to raise the question
is to avoid the issue of responsibility. Even more basically it is for
man to abdicate his very being, his free potentiality to pursue
rationally determined goals.
Thus it is that since Dr. van Rood of the University of Leiden
not quite two years ago developed a primitive method of tissue
typing, the possibility of transplanting the most vital of human organs
has lain within man's grasp. Even before Dr. Christian Barnard made
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the decision to transplant the heart of
Denise Darvall into the body of Louis
Washansky, surgeons around the world
were looking to the day when such an
operation would take place. Yet if the
pioneering efforts of Dr. van Rood and
those surgeons who have profited from
his research have created a new possi-
bility for man, they have also created
an ethical problem - or, more precisely,
they have actualized a potentiality which
raises several ethical questions.
As a matter of fact, it was not long
after Dr. Barnard's initial cardiac trans-
plants that a number of moral and
ethical issues were raised, that a variety
of legislative acts were proposed, and
that several human values were under-
scored in an attempt to bring some
ethical light upon the new surgical pro-
cedure. Within the past year, moreover,
more than a score of studies has been
devoted to the morality of heart trans-
plants. The abundance of this literature,
most of it avowedly not very profound,
yet responsive to a human need, bears
witness to the fact that the possibility
of heart transplants among humans
necessarily and of itself raises the moral
question.
Yet it is true that the possibility of
human heart transplants, like every
possibility which lies before man, neces-
sarily raises an ethical question, it is also
true that the ethical question raised by
the heart transplant possibility is, in many
respects, a unique question. The morality
of heart transplants is a moral issue
quite unlike those issues of medical ethics
which most doctors and not a few lay-
men have to face during their lifetimes.
The uniqueness of ethical concern with
respect to heart transplants is principally
the result of two factors.
In the first place, we are concerned
with a vital organ, a vital organ of which
only one exists in the living person, a
vital organ for which there currently
exists no prosthetic substitute. Despite
the fact that already four years ago thirteen
institutions, with the assistance of grants
from the National Heart Institute, had
done research work on a number of
different types of artificial hearts, no
substitute has yet been found for the
human heart. Thus both the irreplace-
ability and the unicity of the human
heart make the transplanting of the
human heart a unique surgical pro-
cedure, vastly different, in its ethical
implications, from the transplanting of
other vital organs. In a unique fashion,
the question of life and death must be
faced by those who consider the possi-
bility of a heart transplant. To focus
attention upon the ethics of heart trans-
plants is indeed to focus attention upon
the life and death of both donor and
recipient. Unlike most medical questions
of ethical concern, the issue of heart
transplants allows for no compromise,
and the answer to the question raised
permits no correction. This factor alone
intensifies the ethical concerns in heart
transplantation.
Yet there is another factor to be con-
sidered which makes the heart transplant
operation something unique for the
ethician, if not always and in immediate
fashion, for the surgeon. This is the
fact that the heart is an organ which has
not only biological function, but also
symbolic significance. Generations of
men have celebrated the heart in song
and art. Men of all cultures have con-
sidered the heart as a metonym for the
human person. This simply means that
there is associated with the human heart
a network of significance, not founded
on biological data, but which all the same
exists. The existence of this symbolic
filagree gives an added dimension to the
ethical concerns in the matter of heart
transplants. Man's emotive and psychic
response to the idea of "manipulating"
the heart must be considered. We need
only think of the prejudice which still
exists among large segments of our
population with respect to psychiatry to
realize that there necessarily exists a
number of human problems, spontaneous
reactions arising from the subconscious,
emotions and attitudes, which must also
be our concern when we consider the
morality of heart transplants.
It must also be stated that if a new
possibility constitutes a new responsibility
for man, this same new possibility creates
a demand either for the formulation of
new norms of behavior or the refinement
of the old norms. The statement of ethical
principles and of moral norms is not
now made in a vacuum, nor were these
norms and principles themselves developed
in a vacuum. Rather they are the result
of inductive reflection upon existing
circumstances in the light of a certain
value system.
This means that principles and norms
are susceptible to change when the
situations to which they are applicable
change. It means that they are suscep-
tible to change when man's self-under-
standing changes. It means that it is
values which both furnish consistency to
evolving moral norms and ever more
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developed principles, and which serve as
the root source of these norms and
principles themselves.
The essential value which must occupy
our consideration in the matter of heart
transplants is the value of human life
itself. It is upon human life that other
human values are dependent: freedom,
truth, health, and dominion. Conse-
quently ethical man has always sought
to protect life. Religious man esteems
human life not only as the source of
human achievement, but more radically
as the gift of God to him. He conse-
quently admits that he does not have
final authority over the disposition of his
own life. His creed is that life itself
has value insofar as it is life related to
God.
Furthermore, life as it actually exists is
life existing in a delicate tension between
society and the individual. The life of
the individual man is not truly human
apart from society; nor can the society
of man exist apart from the individual
lives of those who comprise society.
Thus, the existential value of human life
which serves as the necessary criterion of
moral judgment is life in tension between
the individual and society.
In a word, human life is the value
with which we are concerned. As an
existential value, however, human life
cannot be considered in isolated or
abstract fashion. Moreover, human life
is a positive value, a value which man,
including the man of faith, has sought
to protect and promote by surrounding
it with a series of positive norms and a
number of prohibitions. The moral
norms of medical ethics and scientific
research have life, human life, in all its
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complexity, as their object. It is human
life which must be preserved, protected,
and furthered.
Indeed, the avoidance of death itself
is a moral norm precisely because death
is itself the negation of life. In effect,
this is to state that the avoidance of
death has moral value insofar as it is a
means by which life itself is protected.
This may seem as a truism or even as a
tautology, but it is not. The common
sense of mankind and the Christian
tradition have never made the avoidance
of death an absolute obligation. Indeed,
the Christian tradition specifically assigns
a positive value to death; and man in
his wisdom lauds the death of the patriot
and hero. Death, in other words, is
endowed with positive significance when
it is accepted as a necessary instrument
of life, but not when it is sought as the
destruction of life.
Christian tradition theologically inter-
prets and celebrates death as it does
precisely because it looks to death as a
passage to a fuller life. The common
estimation of mankind mourns the loss
of the patriot-martyr or soldier, but
praises his death, because it looks to his
death as a means by which the life of the
nation is preserved and protected.
Society has accepted capital punishment
to the degree that it has judged such a
punishment necessary to the fuller
human life of the greater society; but
man's moral sensibilities are affronted
when capital punishment is inflicted in a
spirit of vengence and vindictiveness.
This consideration of human life as a
basic value, and of death as a disvalue
insofar as it constitutes the negation of
life, is of paramount importance in. the
consideration of heart transplants. The
reason is simply the fact that man
questions first the death of the donor.
Press reports have cast some suspicion
upon the circumstances of death of some
heart donors. It has been widely affirmed
that the first heart transplant took place
in South Africa because the legal criteria
for affirming death were simply the
cessation of respiration and heart beat.
As a matter of fact, the issue of the
death of the donor is itself a complex
one. Was the donor dead when the
removal operation was begun? Was the
death of the donor hastened or permitted
in order to make him a more suitable
donor? What are the criteria by which
death can be diagnosed? To what extent
should the recognition of these criteria
be mandated by law? The value is that
of human life. The responsibility is that
of the doctor and society to protect and
strengthen human life. The issue is, how-
ever, the definition of death and the
discernableness of death.
To look to the death of the donor as
the key ethical issue in the matter of
cardiac transplants is to call attention to
the rights of the donor in surgical pro-
cedures of this type.
1. First among his rights is his right to
life. All reasonable efforts must be made
to restore the donor-patient to a state of
health and well-being. To protect the
prospective donor's right to life, it has
been suggested that two medical-surgical
teams be involved in every transplant
operation. The first would be charged
with the care of the donor-patient, the
second with the care of the recipient-
patient. Only when the first team has
reached the decision that it is impossible
to arrest the impetus towards death of
the patient, would the second team be
permitted to take charge of the donor-
patient. That is, only after prudent
medical judgment had affirmed that the
patient was in the category of the
deceased could he be treated as a donor.
It must, of course be noted that there
are several ways of defining death. In
one philosophical system, death can be
defined as the final separation of soul
from body. Clinical death can be
described as the cessation of vital func-
tions. Biological death is characterized
by cellular decomposition of the brain.
In the wake of the early wave of heart
transplants, an Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School proposed
four criteria of death, namely: 1) un-
receptivity and unresponsivity; 2) the
absence of spontaneous muscular move-
ment; 3) the loss of reflexes; and 4) a
flat electro-encephalogram (EEG) reading.
Yet as precisely as the criteria indi-
cating death may be refined, it must
always be remembered that the indication
of death is not to be equated with death
itself. In man's human existence, his
personal reality transcends its bodily ex-
pression. The physical body of man is
a sign and expression of man's personal
being. Death affects man in his personal
being. Physical signs of death are an
indication of death. They are not death
itself. Death itself is the irreversible and,
of itself, imperceptible cessation of vital
activity.
This having been noted, it must be
repeated that the prime area of medical
responsibility is the preservation and
development of human life itself, not the
mere avoidance of death.
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2. The prospective donor has, none-
theless, a right to die. Death is part of
the human condition. To be human is to
be in movement towards death. Con-
sequently the prospective donor should
enjoy the exercise of one of his rights,
esteemed most highly by the Christian
tradition, namely his right to die in peace
and dignity.
This necessarily raises the question of
the prolongation of life in a physical,
rather than personal sense with a view
towards the utilization of organs in
transplant operations. Although the-goal
is laudable, the procedure is of question-
able ethical quality, especially if the
procedure is employed contrary to the
previously expressed will of the donor
himself.
3. The donor has a right to freedom
and personal autonomy. His right to his
personal autonomy implies that he has
the first and proper right to determine
the final disposition of his body and his
bodily organs. If he has the right to
dispose of his properties and other
possessions, he also has the right to dis-
pose of his body and its organs, the very
first and most expressive of his posses-
sions. This right includes the right to
designate a specific beneficiary in any
given instance.
The donor's right to personal autonomy,
to self-disposition, is a right which no
other individual and no society can
legitimately usurp. The donor must be
free from coercion in the decisions which
he makes with respect to the disposition
of his organs. His freedom from coercion
must be protected, if necessary by legisla-
tion, in the days ahead. Dr. Theodore
Cooper, the director of the National
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Heart Institute, has estimated that there
may be as many as 81,000 potential
beneficiaries of human hearts in the
United States each year. To meet the
potential need, the hearts of approxi-
mately one third of all who die from
causes other than cardiac failure and
cancer will be needed. Undoubtedly
there will arise the danger of coercion
being brought to bear upon potential
donors.
The donor's right to personal autonomy
further implies that the potential donor
be supplied with the information necessary
for him to make his decision wisely. He
should be apprized of the possibility of
designating his organs for the use of
others, as well as of the good which can
accrue to another and to society because
of a successful transplant operation.
Responsibility for conveying such infor-
mation rests upon society as a whole,
and specifically upon the physician at-
tending the patient-potential donor.
To assure that the right of the in-
dividual to dispose of his body and its
organs is respected, some Uniform
Anatomical Gifts legislation would seem
to be required. Such legislation would
recognize the prior claim of the potential
donor's expressed will with regard to his
bodily organs and would facilitate the
rapid execution of a heart transplant
operation - this, of course, to the
greater benefit of the beneficiary.
With respect to the donor, it must also
be noted that the principle which serves
as the most accurate criterion for a moral
judgment in the area of organ trans-
plantation is not the principle of totality
- and certainly not the principle of
totality, narrowly conceived. Rather the
operative principle must always be con-
cern for one's fellow man, that concern
which Christian tradition calls charity
and which it recognizes as the summit of
moral perfection.
4. The donor has, furthermore, the
right to privacy. The donor should not
be allowed to become the object of public
wonder. Both he and his family should
not be made subject to public scrutiny.
Even a public figure is entitled to
privacy. A fortiori a private individual,
in tragic circumstances, enjoys the same
fundamental human right. And yet
respect for the privacy of the donor and
his family is often violated by those
whose quest for curiosity leads to impor-
tunate reporting and ill-advised publica-
tion. Such action is basically a denial of
a fundamental human right.
5. Finally, the donor has the right to
bodily respect. He has a right to expect
considerate treatment of his body after
death. He has a right to a burial in
keeping with his religious beliefs and
traditions. Christian tradition has con-
sistently considered the body as the
temple of the Holy Spirit and has con-
sequently demanded that even the bodies
of the deceased be treated with reverence
and respect.
If the donor of a heart has his rights,
so too does the family of the donor.
They have secondary and subordinate
rights over the body and vital organs of
the donor. In the exercise of these rights
they are morally bound to follow the
wishes of the donor, even if these wishes
have not been expressed in a form which
is legally binding (e.g., a will).
The family of the donor likewise has
a right to privacy, particularly during a
period of bereavement. Finally, the
family has a right to make a judicious
decision. This implies that they have a
moral right to sufficient knowledge about
the proposed transplant operation so that
they can make a decision in rational and
human fashion. It also implies that the
decision be made with sufficient delibera-
tion and serenity of spirit. All parties to
the discussion on the possibility and
feasibility of organ transplantation must
carefully consider the personal turmoil
with which the family of the deceased are
often afflicted at the time of death.
Tragic circumstances do not always allow
for or lead to the most prudent decision.
From the donor and his family our
attention should then turn to the doctor
and his surgical team. Doctors are pri-
mary witnesses to natural law obligations
in the matter of heart transplants.
Ethically and morally they are bound to
protect and promote human life. By a
quasi-contractual agreement they are
bound to care for the life and health of
their patients. Their experience gives
them the ability to judge most prudently
in matters of life and death. Conse-
quently their expressed or implicit judg-
ment should be regarded by all as a
primary witness to ethical concern.
Doctors, moreover, have their rights
which society has a duty to protect.
Doctors must be protected against law-
suits emanating from unscrupulous
patients and their relatives. Yet the pro-
tection which they should be afforded
under law should not be given at the
price of over-legislation which would
impede medical progress.
Finally, with regard to doctors, a
distinction must be made between ex-
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perimental procedures and therapeutic
procedures. At the present time the
heart transplant operations are not
similarly judged by the surgeons who have
performed them. Thus Dr. Shumway has
spoken of a "clinical trial," whereas Dr.
Barnard speaks of "therapy."
To make such a distinction is not to
reject experimentation as intrinsically
immoral. Experimentation is necessary
for the advance of medical knowledge
and surgical science, but such experi-
mentation is justifiable only when it has
the welfare of man in view and only if
it takes place after sufficient preparations
have been made and similar experimenta-
tion has been performed on sub-human
forms of life.
Nor does this distinction intend to deny
that surgical procedures which are
primarily intended to be beneficial to the
patient, in this case to the recipient of
the transplanted heart, are often still in
an experimental stage of development.
Certainly the use of such experimental
means is warranted when the use of more
commonly accepted procedures is judged
to be ineffectual. Rather, the distinc-
tion must be stressed in order to un-
derscore the fact that the rights and
obligations of the parties to a heart
transplant operation assume a different
form according to the nature of the
surgical procedure.
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged
that society also is a party to heart
transplant operations. It is more than an
interested observer. In a very real sense
society is involved in heart transplant
operations - and society also has its
rights.
Society as a whole has a right to the
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protection of life as a societal value. It
cannot afford that human life be reduced
to the level of an object of clinical manip-
ulation. It has the right, and consequent
duty, to protect and promote the human
life and personal subjectivity of each of
its citizens.
It is in keeping with this essential
right that society itself must confront
the question, "Who shall live, and who
shall die?". It is difficult to establish
specific criteria for answering the ques-
tion, but some general indications can
certainly be offered.
1. The relative chances for success in
a transplant operation and the prospects
for a return to normal activity must be
carefully weighed. From the moral
standpoint, he who has a greater possi-
bility of return to a normal life has a
greater claim to a new heart than he for
whom the new heart will, given, for
example, the deterioration of other vital
organs, merely prolong life without
restoration to a state of relatively normal
vitality.
2. The general good of society must
also be considered. Normally this value
is best protected when all potential donors
are considered ex aequo. However, the
value to society of a given individual -
and I would think that the number of
such individuals is relatively small -
could result in a prior claim to a new
heart of that individual over the rights
of other members of society.
Indeed, society protects all of its
members, but affords a special protection
to the President because of his value to
society. For society to recognize the
priority of claim of a given individual to
a new heart is simply an extension of its
recognition that certain members of
society are so valuable that they must be
protected by more than ordinary
measures.
3. The time factor can serve as a
final criterion by which an answer to this
burning question can be formulated. All
other factors being equal, "first come, first
served" can function as a rule of thumb
to preserve equity in determining the
rights of prospective heart recipients.
Finally, in order to safeguard the
right to life of prospective recipients,
society has the obligation to look to the
establishment of banks in which the vital
organs, including the heart, can be
preserved with a view to later use.
This remark leads to a consideration
of the rights of the recipient in a heart
transplant operation. His rights can no
more be neglected than can those of the
donor.
1. The prospective recipient has the
right to his own humanity and a right to
life. As a human person, he is radically
the equal of other human beings. As a
child of God, he is the equal of other
children of God. As a citizen, he is the
equal of other citizens. Consequently
each prospective recipient has radically
the same right to life that others do.
Accidental considerations of wealth and
status are, and must remain, independent
of man's essential and inalienable right
to life. Man's fundamentally equal right
to life must be protected, if necessary, by
legislation in the area of public health
and insurance regulation. It is radically
immoral for finances to be the determining
factor in the exercise of man's right to
life, since each man's life is essentially
as sacred as that of his neighbor.
2. The recipient has a right to his
personal identity. It may be that the
transplant of a human heart leads to
serious psychological sequelae in the
recipient. Recently, for example, the
British Medical Journal (1968, p. 539)
has reported a case in which the trans-
plant of a kidney from a female donor
to a male recipient constituted a threat
to the recipient's sexual identity. Given
the extensive network of associations
surrounding the human heart, there is
reason to believe that some identity
crisis can be caused by a heart trans-
plant.
3. The recipient has the right to expect
reasonable success in the transplant
operation. When such success cannot
reasonably be assured, he has the right
to such information as will enable him to
make a reasonable decision.
4. The recipient of a new heart, has,
furthermore, the right to privacy. An
individual who has been involved in a
heart transplant operation does not, by
that very fact, become public property.
As a human being he has a fundamental
right to lead his private life, sheltered
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from the public gaze. Privacy is, after
all, necessary to the development of a
life that is fully human. Man's privacy
must be protected as a sign of respect
for the sacrosanctity and inviolability of
the human person.
Finally, and by way of conclusion, it
must be stated that there are several
human rights and a plurality of authentic
values to be protected in heart transplant
operations. Of these the most sacred is
life itself, which the Christian esteems as
the gift of God to man. To protect the
gift of life itself, the greatest possible
measure of freedom and discretion should
be accorded to doctors. Insofar as it is
possible, the judgment of those who have
devoted their lives to the preservation and
development of human life should be
respected.
After life itself, the most sacred of
human rights is the right to personal
autonomy. It is a right whose exercise
is limited by the rights of others. It is a
right which is not absolute, yet a right
which ought not to be usurped. Society
is, after all, not the lord of its members;
that role belongs only to the Creator.
